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Diverse identities, some socially shared, arise from a person‟s affiliation with multiple 
overlapping communities, which are non-disjoint subsets of persons in society. I prove that 
identification of each individual with binary preferences or their utility function representation, 
commonplace in economic theory, implies the impossibility of social-identity diversification of 
persons. Therefore, if the goal is to explain injustices based on social identity distinctions such as 
racial discrimination, the conceptual reach of economic theory needs extension. I propose a 
generalization by assigning non-binary preferences to each individual player to achieve 
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In contemporary economic theory – in general equilibrium or game-theoretic form – each 
person in society or player in a game is characterized by a ranking relation of preference that 
satisfies the property of binariness.
1
 In addition, Amartya Sen (1994a) points out that there is an 
implicit restriction in economic theory that for a decision maker, the instrumental value of 
behavioral action norms is zero in promoting or eroding individual wellbeing. Action norms, 
which exert their influence by deliberately restricting individual “instrumental possibilities” of 
persons who share that social identity, have the consequence of effectively restricting the set of 
actions considered socially acceptable in the community to which the person belongs, rendering 
acceptable actions a proper subset of the externally-feasible set, which is independent of 
community action norms. In this paper I argue that there is a compelling case for dropping both 
assumptions: binariness of preferences and zero instrumental value of restrictive action norms, at 
the individual level, so as to increase the scope and reach of economic theory. I do so, and 
explore some of the consequences of such a generalization for economic theory.
2
 The rewards, as 
one would expect, are bountiful. 
Alternative approaches to characterizing a person as a decision maker in economic theory 
can be subjected to informational analysis, by examining each approach in terms of the types of 
information that it admits and the types it excludes. Naturally, the stronger the restrictions placed 
on the characterization of a person, the greater is the information rendered inadmissible in 
describing a person. In turn, narrower will be the variability of the characteristics of any given 
person, and thus greater the extent of homogeneity across distinct persons. This binariness 
restriction on preference is so parasitic on information that it leaves very little wriggle room for 
exhibiting variety of traits in any given person. As expected, the entailed diversity of distinctive 
traits across persons is rendered severely limited.
 
 
In fact, I prove that if each person in society is identified with a ranking relation of 
preference that satisfies the property of binariness then social identity diversification of two or 
more individuals is impossible. This impossibility theorem renders binary-preference based 
economic theory, including every theory that identifies an individual with a utility function, quite 
                                                 
1
 It could represent „revealed choice behavior‟ or „desire fulfillment‟ as payoff or wellbeing. I take up this matter 
later. 
2
 I have nothing to add in this paper about “production units” in the economic theory contained in Arrow and Debreu 
(1954), nor about aggregate supply of each commodity, both of which I take on board exactly as in their work. My 
only innovation consists in characterizing their “consumption units” with a more general preference structure.  
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inadequate for examining many commonly observed forms of individual and group behavior in 
which interpersonal social-identity distinctions are material to the phenomena, including 
injustices such as racial, gender or ethnic discrimination, as discussed in Basu (2010), Akerlof 
and Kranton (2000) and Becker (1957), among others.
3
 These analysts identify each person with 
a utility function, which entails binary individual preferences, and by the force of my 
impossibility result, it banishes social-identity diversification of persons, inter alia rendering 
discrimination on the basis of social identity impossible to occur in their conceptions of an 
economy. 
If my claim is correct, it must be the case that in the aforementioned analyses, diversity of 
social identities is exogenously imposed on persons who, in fact, have endogenously homogenous 
identities. This is because the binariness restriction serves to purge the model of all information 
pertinent to the conceptual reach and terminological scope of social identity diversification. If 
everyone has a solitary, homogenous identity, it is not clear who exactly is at the receiving end 
of social-identity based injustice and who is accorded preferential treatment, except by an ad hoc 
assertion to that effect by the theorist.
4
 In fact, in the context of sum-ranking utilitarianism, Sen 
and Williams (1982, p.4) claim that “persons do not count as individuals in this any more than 
individual petrol tanks do in an analysis of the national consumption of petroleum.” Hence, if the 
object of investigation is social-identity diversification and injustices based thereon, escape from 
binariness of personal preferences is necessary. 
Without endogenous differentiability of persons by social identity, all persons have a 
unique, solitary identity: if one is a single, white female in her thirties with two children in 
school, she lives in the United States and works full-time at a local diner at the prevailing 
minimum wage rate, then everybody else in society is a replica of her in terms of all these marks 
of social identity, except her income; not even two creatures with socially-distinct identities such 
as male and female can populate a society if everyone‟s preferences are binary. Discrimination 
                                                 
3
 When I refer to a personal utility function, I refer strictly to the utility indicator function as part of rational choice 
theory in Arrow and Debreu (1954). This function    ( ) is a real-valued numerical representation of individual 
preferences, and it exists if personal preferences are represented by (i) a binary ranking relation R that stands for “at 
least as good as”, it completely orders the person‟s feasible set S of mutually exclusive alternatives (is (ii) reflexive, 
(iii) transitive and (iv) complete), is (v) continuous, and if (vi) S is bounded from below, rendering  ( ) also 
continuous and bounded from below. Such a real valued, continuous function bounded from below qualifies to be 
called a utility function if and only if         ((   )  , ( )   ( )-)  ((   )  , ( )   ( )-), where P 
is the asymmetric part of R, and I is to be treated as the symmetric part of R. 
4
 This critique applies to the work reported in Akerlof (1976), Stiglitz (1974), Phelps (1972), Spence (1974), and 
Basu (2005), among others, regardless of whether this is done in general equilibrium or game theoretic models. 
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by social identity is naturally impossible. Such a group of creatures may be many things, but a 
human society, as we know it, is not one of them. We are much more socially diverse.
5
 
Some variation among persons is admissible: one person is distinct form another if, and 
only if, one person‟s ranking of at least a pair of alternatives is the negation of the other‟s 
ranking of the same pair of alternatives. No more diversity across distinct persons or players is 
admissible, however, based on preferences. That is the extent to which binariness purges 
information on all other criteria, such as social identities, on which persons or players could have 
differed in the model. There can thus be interpersonal differences among decision makers in 
terms of (i) distinct incomes or wealth holdings, or (ii) distinct environments of others‟ 
conjectures about specific persons,
6
 or (iii) different information sets, all of which are external to 
preferences, or (iv) distinct preferences, with distinct rankings of at least a pair of alternatives 
(including due to differences in risk aversion). However, in terms of social identity, there cannot 
be any differences across persons.
7
 Under the force of the binariness restriction (or of a utility 
function representation of binary preferences), as noted above, all persons are rendered 
completely homogenous in terms of having a solitary identity.
8
 
Characterizing each individual by using greater information than is permitted by the 
binariness restriction is necessary to be able to distinguish between persons by their distinct, 
though possibly shared, social identities also. What is needed is an informational broadening of 
the conceptual foundations of behavioral economic theory to increase the reach of theory beyond 
the limits of behavioral phenomena it is at present capable of apprehending. One way of 
achieving this is to consider a society with a finite number of persons, as in Arrow and Debreu 
(1954), but by replacing their binariness-based preference structure by Kanger-Sen non-binary 
individual preferences, as in Sen (1994b).
9
 The resultant model, with two additional restrictions, 
that preferences are reflexive and transitive, is a sufficiently rich framework – that has additional 
conceptual flexibility and vocabulary to go with it – to be able to also permit a coherent 
discussion of social identity differentiation and conflict or cooperation among individuals on that 
                                                 
5
 In fact, it is not altogether clear that social norms constitute a well-defined concept for such a group of asocial 
creatures. 
6
 Basu (2010) relies heavily on this feature of distinction among persons. 
7
 In Basu‟s (2010) theory there can also be interpersonal differences in productivity, but more on that presently.  
8
 The game sometimes called „the battle of the sexes‟ is a misnomer; it is, in fact, a homogenous-sex battle. 
9
 It is crucial to note that while binariness has a very precise definition, non-binariness can take a multitude of forms, 
and not all forms of non-binary individual preferences contain sufficient information to exhibit endogenous social 
identity diversification, on which more in Sections 3 and 5 presently. 
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basis. From this model, which is a generalization of the Arrow-Debreu model, new insights 
related to multiple identities of socially differentiated persons can be obtained in addition to the 
understanding already gained from the formal general equilibrium and game theory models with 
social-identity invariant individuals, including applications of these models to international trade, 
public economics, labor economics, industrial organizational structures, and so on. 
The transition from binary preferences to Kanger-Sen non-binary preferences lets 
sufficient information back into the model to permit endogenous social identity diversification of 
individual persons or players, and more, including the possibility of multiplicity of motivations, 
although the existence of a utility function is a casualty of non-binariness.
10
 This achieves a 
theoretical extension that characterizes an economy as a collection of individuals who have 
distinct social identities, who engage in volitional acts of choice mediated via personal well-
being maximization with deliberate restriction of individual instrumentalities by social norms.
11
  
Social norms are specific context-dependent rules of behavior (particular code of 
conduct) to which persons are obligated to conform, sometimes to some significant extent, 
because they are members of a community (subset of persons) in society. A person‟s affiliation 
with multiple, overlapping communities is precisely what gives that person a distinctive set of 
marks of social identification, which, taken collectively, define the person‟s social identity. 
Social identity gives a person a social character in terms of traits shared with others (e.g., 
ethnicity, gender), in addition to the individual character based on traits unique to a person (e.g., 
fingerprints, personal privacy). It is precisely in a society with such persons who have multiple, 
overlapping social identities that social norms are born, they evolve, and sometimes become 
fortified into rules of behavior considered acceptable versus contemptible conduct, which at 
times carries a punishment of excommunication or being ostracized from the community whose 
norms a person has flaunted.
12
 Such shared values, which form one part of culture, vary from one 
society to another. 
 The economic theory I seek is grounded in firm choice-theoretic foundations, as in 
Arrow and Debreu. I shift attention to such foundations, to develop a more general economic 
                                                 
10
 See Section 4 below. 
11
 Sen (1994a, p. 385) alludes indirectly to a non-binary approach to preferences by giving the example of “Menu-
dependent behavior, [which,]while socially important, would tend to violate” a set-theoretic property known as 
contraction consistency, and inter alia, “binariness” or “rationalizability” of choice, “as they are typically defined 
(i.e., over sets of outcomes only), would be violated too. With that would go real-valued representation of preference 
orderings over the outcomes.” 
12
 There can be a multitude of distinct reason why individual are affiliated with distinct communities. 
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theory. In this context, Sen (1994a) makes an important distinction between the “choice-
salience” and “well-being” interpretations of a person‟s preference, in “traditional economic 
theory, or standard game theory.”13 Sen (1994a, p. 386) explains, “A divergence between choice 
and well-being can easily arise when behavior is influenced by motivation other than the pursuit 
of one‟s own interest or welfare (e.g., through a sense of commitment, or respect for duty).”14 
Thus, in addition to the pursuit of one‟s own welfare, if another motivation also guides 
individual behavior, such as a self-imposed restraint of 
the Kantian requirements of action morality … “Act always on such a maxim as thou canst at the same time 
will it to be universal law”, then “the people involved … could all end up having more fulfillment of their 
unmodified [personal well-being salient] preferences. … Obviously, confessing oneself is not such an act in 
the [unrepeated] prisoner‟s dilemma, since neither prisoner wants that behavior to be “universal.” The 
Smithian-Kantian self-imposed restraints differ from constraints given from outside. 
It is, of course, possible to translate the impact of instrumental constraints – even self-imposed ones – into 
reconstructed “objective functions” … But then the interpretation of the “objectives” would have to be 
correspondingly different … The crucial question is not whether the “maximizing format” can continue to 
work in the Smithian-Kantian case (it certainly can), but whether there are reasonable arguments that 
support self-imposition of action norms, with a deliberate restriction of instrumental possibilities.
15
 
Sen (1997) demonstrates two equivalent ways of modeling an individual who abides by 
social norms.
16
 One is maximizing a person‟s binary wellbeing-salient preference subject to self-
imposed restraints, and the other is maximizing a person‟s non-binary ranking relation of 
wellbeing-salient preference, which is formally a binary relation that is conditional on the 
person‟s background set, as in late Stig Kanger‟s departure from binariness.17 Despite the 
equivalence that Sen establishes, if the object is to gain a better understanding of racial 
discrimination, tribal conflict, and the like, the binary preference approach gets trumped by the 
non-binary one, because the former cannot distinguish conceptually between any two persons on 
the basis of their distinct social identities. 
I also prove that if each person is identified with a Kanger-Sen non-binary ranking 
relation (defined on a finite set) of weak preference in the well-being sense, and this relation is 
                                                 
13
 Sen (1994a, p. 385). 
14
 Sen (1994a) points out that multiplicity “of motivations was explicitly accepted” as significant influences driving 
individual behavior, “by the pioneers of utility theory in economics.” 
15
 Sen (1994a, p. 387), italics in original. 
16
 Certainly, one way to proceed is to start with a person‟s binary preferences in the well-being sense, and maximize 
them subject to self-imposed constraints (e.g., Kant‟s categorical imperative), which restrict individual instrumental 
choices, in addition to non-instrumental constraints (such as those of the budget or availability), to arrive at a 
“reconstructed” personal binary preference that could be legitimately given a choice-salience interpretation because 
it reflects behavioral outcome. 
17
 See Sen (1994b). 
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reflexive and transitive under all variations of a person‟s background set, then there exists a 
social state with endogenous diversification of persons by social identity, and it is Pareto 
optimal. This result follows immediately from Zorn‟s lemma. Despite Pareto optimality, 
however, this social state could be a manifestation of the vilest of social injustices; nasty 
remediable injustices do not disappear if the concept of a person is endowed with communal 
characteristics in addition to individualistic. 
Further, since individual preferences are assumed to be wellbeing salient, there is no 
harm in enquiring if a social state, which I show exists, and in which every individual has 
maximized one‟s own non-binary preferences, if this state is Pareto optimal. This is because such 
optimality is itself interpreted in terms of the wellbeing achieved by each person.
18
  
Characterizing a person as a maximizer of personal well-being salient Kanger-Sen non-
binary ranking relation of weak preference has the added advantage that persons are also free to 
choose among alternative patterns of action-norm-restrictions of behavior, in addition to 
exhibiting a diversity of social identities. Thus in my model, the instrumental value of behavioral 
action norms can be zero, but it is also permitted to be positive.  
At a practical level, the non-binary preference based model I propose is a framework with 
sufficient conceptual and informational richness that it can fruitfully be used for examining 
injustices based on social identity distinctions among individuals, and to investigate the nature of 
context-dependent implementable remedies.
19
 It is not my purpose here to provide a theory of 
discrimination, but rather to provide a theoretical framework that can serve as a vehicle for 
explaining such phenomena, and for guidance on this specific matter, I rely mainly on Arrow 
(1998) and Basu (2010).
20
 
                                                 
18
 By contrast, if the existence of a competitive general equilibrium is seen in terms of behavior-salient “revealed” 
preferences, then it is deeply problematic to juxtapose it with a social state called Pareto optimal, in which 
individual preferences are understood to have wellbeing-salient content. 
19
 This paper makes no innovation on the production side of the model of an economy. Associated with command 
and accumulation of resources, production-sector association by social identity could be an enlightening issue to 
address. In India, for instance, members of certain caste tend to specialize more in business, statistically, while those 
of another persuasion adhere to more austere traditions such as teaching or preaching; the warlords would have land-
holdings and dealings with labor.     
20
 Arrow (1998) restrains himself from offering up a theory of discrimination, but asks instead, “What Has 
Economics to Say about Racial Discrimination?” Arrow (1998, p.93) writes, 
We have clear evidence that blacks were in the past excluded from a significant range of jobs and from 
purchase of housing and restaurant services. We have very strong evidence that these practices persist in 
some important measure. I … suggest … that market-based explanations will tend to predict that racial 
discrimination will be eliminated. Since they are not, we must seek elsewhere for non-market factors 
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Some analytical issues relating to the binariness of a choice-behavioral maximal function 
are covered in Section 2. The principal result on the impossibility of social identity 
diversification under binariness is proved in Section 3. Section 4 deals with some conceptual 
issues related to Kanger-Sen non-binary preference (in the well-being sense) relation of an 
individual, including the impossibility of existence of a utility function for non-binary 
preferences. Section 5 provides a brief, bare-bones approach to non-binary individual 
preferences in a finite society, and the possibility of social diversity of persons, and presents the 
main argument. Section 6 contains an existence and optimality result of a social interaction 
outcome, a generalization of the concept of general equilibrium, which may be fraught with 
injustices. Section 7 illustrates a preliminary examination of racial discrimination in the United 
States in a conjectural general equilibrium model, and deals with some methodological issues 
that such an exercise exposes. Section 8 contains some concluding remarks. 
2. Binariness of Behavioral Maximal Function or of Wellbeing Ranking Relation 
Let X be a universal set, and   a collection of non-empty subsets of X. In this paper I 
shall take X to be a finite set.21 In a standard approach to the property of binariness, it is common 
to proceed by taking a maximal set as a primitive concept, in the following manner. 
Definition 1: A maximal set of a set  is defined as  ( )  ( ( )         ). 
Definition 2: A correspondence        is defined as a maximal function over  if, and 
only if,    ( )  *     ( )      ( )         +. 
The following conditions are defined for a maximal function   ( ) over . 
Contraction Consistency (CC):          :,   ( )       -     ( ).22  
Expansion Consistency (EC)
23
: (         ):         ( ), where 
   
                                                                                                                                                             
influencing economic behavior. The concepts of direct social interaction and networks seem to be good 
places to start. 
Networks as communities with which persons are affiliated, and social interaction in the forms of interpersonal 
interaction among socially diverse creatures, is precisely what I attempt to achieve in this paper. 
21
 This is not an essential assumption, but it is made only to obviate repeated additional qualifications that could 
detract from clarity in communicating the central points that I wish to drive home. 
22
 Equivalently,         (   )  , ( )   ( )-is the contraction consistency property of the maximal 
function.  
23
 For pairs of sets       , , ( )   ( )-    (   ) is Property    in Sen (1971, p. 314), except that I have 
defined it for behavioral maximal sets, instead of his treatment in terms of choice sets. Property EC is the finite 
closure of Property    in terms of maximal sets. 
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  ⋂  (  )
     
    ⋃    
     
  
Venn diagram representations of CC and EC can be particularly illuminating. 
               
                 (S1US2US3)    (S1)∩ (S2)∩ (S3) 
        Figure 1                          Figure 2 
    Contraction Consistency of   ( ) over  Expansion Consistency of   ( ) over  
 
Definition 3: A maximal function   ( ) over  is binary if, and only if,   ( )     (   ) &  
  (   )  {            ,          -     }   ,   
where    is defined as      (        ). 
 
Theorem 2.1:   ( ) over  is a binary maximal function if, and only if, it satisfies CC and EC. 
That is,   ( )    (   ) if, and only if, CC & EC are true. 
 
Proof: (Step 1) Suppose   ( ) over   is binary. Then   ( )    (   ), as specified in 
Definition 3. Let     ( ) over  . Then     (   ) by binariness, so that  (   
      )       Also, if                , then  (         )      , so 
that     (   ). But by binariness of the maximal function,   (   )     ( )      . 
Therefore,     ( ). Thus binariness of a maximal function implies that it satisfies CC. 
(Step 2) Suppose (         ), the antecedent of EC,    , is true. This implies that 
    (  )        . Suppose  
 (  ) is binary       . Then  
 (  )   
 (    )      
  . Also, from Definition 3,  (        
  )        , which, in turn, implies that  (   
      ), so that     (   ). But by binariness of the maximal function,   (   )    ( ). 
Therefore,     ( ), which is the consequent of EC. This proves that a binary maximal 
function   ( ) over   satisfies EC. 
(Step 3) To prove the converse, let     ( ). Notice that     . If      , then CC implies 
that     (  ). Further, if x is in every set  
 (  )   , it must belong to their intersection. 
Thus,     . So, under CC,   ( )   . Next, let    . This and EC together imply that 
    ( ). So, under EC,     ( ). Therefore, CC and EC imply that   ( )   . To 










  (S2) 
 
 
 (S3 ) 
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  ( )    under CC and EC, together with definition 3, according to which   ( )  
  (   ). Thus, ( ) is a binary maximal function over , under CC and EC.  
 
Theorem 2.1 is a technical result that deals with purely logical relationships among sets, 
their subsets, collections of sets, and correspondences. In the triple 〈      (   )〉, it is only 
specified that   is a universal set, that  is a collection of non-empty subsets of  , that   (   ) 
over   is a binary maximal function, and that       for       is a binary ranking relation. 
That is all there is to it.
24
 
Undoubtedly,   ( )    (   ) over   entails certain restrictions on the relationships 
among the elements of 〈      (   )〉, but these restrictions are of a context-independent 
character. If, however, a contextual interpretation is attributed to any single element of 
〈      (   )〉, it permits as admissible some interpretations of the remaining elements, but 
renders inadmissible certain other interpretations of those elements. Inadequate appreciation of 
this issue can be, and has been the cause of considerable confusion in choice theory. I shall 
return to this issue later, after some additional conceptual issues are sorted out. 
While the methodological approach described above takes maximal set and maximal 
function as primitive concepts, and derives a binary ranking relation from it, there is another 
approach to binariness that takes a binary ranking relation as a primitive concept, and derives a 
maximal function from it. This approach is also purely technical, devoid of any intrinsic 
contextual interpretation. I turn to this next. To this end, again let X be a universal set, and   a 
collection of non-empty subsets of X. 
Definition 4: A binary ranking relation (e.g.    or generically)   defined on a non-empty set 
  is:      (                     ). 
Definition 5: The set of all maximal elements of a given, non-empty set   based on the binary 
ranking relation  is called the -maximal set over   and is denoted: 
  (   )  {     ,          -     }  where   is      (        ). 
Definition 6: A correspondence       defined as  
  (   )  {     ,          -     }    is called a -maximal function 
over . 
 
                                                 
24




(a) Both  ( ) and (   ) can be empty, but   ( ) and  (   ) are non-empty. 
(b) In general,  ( )   (   ) and   ( )    (   ), because  ( ) and   ( ) over  
are, in general, not binary, whereas both (   ) and  (   ) are binary. However, in the 
special case that   ( )     (   ) over , we have the following result. 
 
Lemma 2.1:         (   )    (   )      . 
Proof: Follows from Definitions 1 – 3 and 4 – 6. 
2.1 Interpretations of Binariness 
Lemma 2.1 is of crucial importance in clearing up some confusion in the part of choice 
theory that deals with the matter of revealed preference. Essentially this means that   and  are 
two binary ranking relations (as construed in relational logic) defined on the same collection of 
non-empty sets, and both rank elements in any given set exactly in the same order or partial 
order. That‟s all. And no interpretation associated with human beings, or associated with 
anything else, is ascribed to these two, indistinguishable binary relations, if the antecedent of 
Lemma 2.1 is true. This is because, seen purely as results in logic,   (   ) over   and 
  (   ) over   are equivalent in form, and form is the only essential feature of logical 
propositions; they are independent of contextual reference. Substantive issues of epistemic 
coherence arise however, once contextual interpretations of the concepts are entertained. This is 
because equivalence in form does not, by itself, imply equivalence in content. 
To see this, let X be interpreted as a set of alternatives of choice for a person. Then, 
definitions 1 – 3 imply that an admissible interpretation is (i) that   (   ) over   is a binary 
maximal function that represents the outcome of choice conduct by a person, and (ii-a) that   is 
an implicitly defined binary ranking relation, which a person can be hypothetically seen as 
maximizing, to arrive at the behavioral outcome   (   ) over   – this, in Sen‟s (1994a) 
terminology, would be called the choice-salience interpretation of the binary ranking relation  . 
However! Taken together with interpretation (i), it is not an admissible interpretation of     to 
regard it as (ii-b) “the person likes x at least as much as y”. Nothing has been said about a 
person‟s yearnings, desires or wellbeing.  
Based on definitions 4 – 6, instead of definitions 1 – 3 above, it is perfectly legitimate to 
impose on  the interpretation that it (1) is a binary ranking relation of weak preference 
construed as the person “likes x at least as much as y”, which, in Sen‟s (1994a) terminology, 
11 
 
would be called the wellbeing interpretation of the binary ranking relation  . Also,  (   ) 
over   can be legitimately regarded (2a) as a binary  -maximal function over   of a person‟s 
choice based on maximizing preference, . But, taken together with (1), it is not an admissible 
interpretation of  (   ) over   to consider it (2b) as representing the outcome of a person‟s 
choice behavior; instead, it merely represents a person‟s hypothetical choice behavior if it were 
driven solely by the impulse to maximize the personal wellbeing preference relation  . 
Therefore, we have the following result. 
Theorem 2.2: It is impossible, in general, to infer a binary ranking relation that represents 
personal wellbeing from a binary ranking relation that represents the outcome of personal 
behavior, and conversely. 
Proof: Follows from Lemma 2.1. 
A discussion of the underlying concepts is more illuminating that the shortest proof. 
Essentially, in terms of interpretation,   (   ) over   represents choice behavioral outcome 
regardless of the cause of such conduct, thereby ascribing to   a behavior-salient interpretation. 
Instead,   refers to wellbeing-salient-preference relation, and   (   ) over   refers to the 
outcome of  maximization as the cause, irrespective of the behavioral outcome. The distinction 
between choice-based-on-preference   (   ) over   and behavioral outcome   (   ) over 
  arises from additional, possibly divergent, drives that a person could have, such as 
commitment to adhere to social norms or to react so certain choice situations instinctively with 
fight-or-flight conduct. These additional human impulses could, in principle, intervene as causal 
influences to lead a person‟s choice based solely on preference away from the outcome of a 
person‟s behavior. Therefore, there is one interpretation, viz., that of motivation, that is imposed 
on  and a distinct interpretation, viz., that of behavioral-outcome explanation, entailed for  . 
Just because both   and   are binary ranking relations in form, it does not follow that 
they are equivalent in content in the contextual domain of conduct entailing personal well-being 
maximization. If the equivalence of   and   is sought, it would have to be asserted as an 
assumption, i.e., as an imposed condition, not one that is entailed.
25
 Indeed, imposing the 
restriction of binariness on the outcome of maximizing behavior fails to reveal a person‟s 
motivation that underlies such behavior. The literature that regards   (   ) over   as the 
                                                 
25
 Sen (1993) has addressed this distinction with great clarity and force. See Footnote 28 below. 
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outcome of behavior, and simultaneously interprets the binary ranking relation   as a person‟s 
preference construed as wellbeing, which is allegedly “revealed” by the outcome of behavior, 
suffers from the problem of confounding equivalence in form with equivalence in content. In 
fact,   is completely bereft of any reference to a person‟s motivation that might possibly drive a 
person‟s acts or deeds. Individual motivations drive personal behavior: choice behavior refers to 
“what happened” but motivation refers to “why it happened”. 
Moreover, as I have tried to argue, a very strong restriction – that the instrumental value 
of behavioral action norms is zero in promoting (or eroding) individual wellbeing, which is 
implicit in economic theory, defines away any distinction between the two interpretations. I 
permit the possibility of positive instrumental values to be attached to distinct sets of social 
norms – which deliberately restricts individual instrumental possibilities – sometimes to the 
benefit of human beings in society, but far too often by inflicting dreadful injustices on persons 
with specific social identities. I return to this issue later. 
Notice also that in the context of the binary maximal function   (   ) over , the issue 
is not why contraction consistency would be violated by human behavior. Rather, the pertinent 
question is: why must human behavior abide by contraction consistency? For example, {x} = 
  ({x, y}) and {y} =   ({x, y, z}) could be perfectly rational choice behavior, but violates 
contraction consistency.
26
 After all, if the set T is a subset of S, why should the maximal set of T 
be a superset of S, even if x is in both T and S? If, however, due to contraction consistency the 
maximal set of T is a superset of S, this certainly constitutes a restriction, though, I would argue, 
an exceedingly demanding one, and without specifying the context there is absolutely no reason 
why it should be met by choice behavior. All that can be asserted is that   ( )         ( )  
 , but even in the case that          , there is no  context-independent reason why 
  ( )    ( ) must be true. The violation of CC is depicted in Figure 3, and the violation of EC 
in Figure 4. 
                                                 
26
 See Sen (1997). 
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            (S1US2US3)   (S1)∩  (S2)∩ (S3) 
       Contraction Consistency violated   Expansion Consistency violated 
   Figure 3          Figure 4 
Indeed it does not take a leap of faith to envision a circumstance illustrated by Figure 3, 
in which x belongs to S, T is a subset of S, x belongs to T, and x is in  (S), but it is not in  (T).27 
Behavioral maximal sets in Figure 3 violate contraction consistency of the associated maximal 
function, and thus pertain to a non-binary behavioral maximal function. Also, maximal sets 
displayed in Figure 4 violate expansion consistency, if   (, (  )   (  )-   (  )), and thus 




                                                 
27
 This would be the case if x is in  (S) –  (T). 
28
 Sen (1993, p. 495) writes, 
 Internal consistency of choice has been a central concept in demand theory, social choice theory, decision 
theory, behavioral economics, and related fields. … [T]his idea is essentially confused, and there is no way 
of determining whether a choice function is consistent or not without referring to something external to 
choice behavior (such as objectives, values or norms).‟ 
 In the same contribution, Sen (p. 496) goes on to say that he is 
„not arguing, in general, against internal correspondences that may be implied by the substantive nature of 
the specific exercise … , but only against imposing such conditions in an a priori way as requirements of 
“internal consistency.” There is a methodological difference between imposed internal correspondences … 
and entailed internal correspondences … The critique here is concerned solely with the former, not the 
latter.‟ 
Sen (1993, p. 498-99) further argues that 
„the basic difficulty arises from the implicit presumption … that acts of choice are, on their own, like 
statements which can contradict, or be consistent with, each other. That diagnosis is deeply problematic. 
Statements A and not-A are contradictory in a way that choosing x from {x, y} and y from {x, y, z} cannot 
be. … [Such] choices do not, in themselves, entail any such statements.‟ 
 Sen‟s (1993) critique of revealed preference theory, which to date has yet to be  rebutted, is thoroughly devastating 
for the alleged claim that the observation of actual choice behavior, based on some imposed conditions of internal 
consistency of choice, can reveal the chooser‟s preferences. The chooser‟s preferences (or motivations) are, in fact, 
















2.2 Types of Non-binariness 
Contrasted with the precise concept of binariness, non-binariness can take a multitude of 
different forms, and indeed has been accorded multiple conceptions and definitions in the 
literature.
29
 Most discussions of non-binariness in economic theory have, however, tended to 
focus on a set function        as a maximal function over  if, and only if,    ( )  *  
   ( )      ( )         +, with such restrictions imposed on the function that they 
are either weaker than the necessary and sufficient conditions CC and EC taken together, or they 
violate at least one of them. This may be called the maximal-function approach to non-
binariness.
30
 However, as the foregoing discussion should make clear, there cannot be in this 
literature any genuine reference to wellbeing-salient preferences-based rankings or relations or 
sets. It is helpful to distinguish the preference-relational approach to non binariness, which is the 
only one I shall use henceforth, that regards   as a binary ranking relation of weak wellbeing-
salient preference defined on a set   of alternative actions, and   is a background set on which   
depends, so that  ( ) is a non-binary ranking relation of well-being-salient preference, and for 
person i it is given by   (  )          , defined on the set of alternative externally-
feasible actions   . I return to this issue in Section 4. Interestingly, under non-binariness, even 
the formal correspondence between the two maximal functions breaks down, so that the question 
of content equivalence cannot arise. 
On decision making, Arrow‟s (1998, p. 94) conception is that 
 
the individual actors act rationally (that is, by maximizing according to a complete ordering) within the 
constraints imposed by preferences, technology, and beliefs, and by the institutions which determine how 
individual actions interact to determine outcomes. Further, the beliefs are themselves formed by some kind 
of rational process. By economic theory, we mean that in some sense, markets are the central institution in 
which individual actions interact and that other institutions are of negligible importance. 
 
It is important to note that in contrast with Arrow‟s conception, in Sen‟s (1997) formulation of 
rational choice, a person engages in a volitional act of choice by maximizing an incomplete 
                                                 
29
 For instance, a binary ranking of a set of rankings of a set of alternatives, called a meta-ranking, is also a non-
binary ranking of the set of alternatives.  But non-binariness of a ranking relation in the strict Kanger-Sen sense is 
not at all like such a meta-ranking. 
30
 See Deb (2012) for a very comprehensive non-binariness approach to social choice theory. The choice-behavioral 
maximal function approach to non-binariness is, for example, José Alcantud and Carlos Alós-Ferrer (2007), which is 
a perfectly legitimate exercise in mathematical logic, but this has nothing whatsoever to do with the preference-
driven act of choice by a person. Deb also refers to the literature in which the collection of sets   is such that each 
set has at least h elements, with    , as another way of defining non-binary choice-functional approach. 
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ranking by a non-binary personal preference relation that quasi-orders a feasible set. I return to 
the matter of “the beliefs are themselves formed by some kind of rational process” later. 
I do not abandon maximization as a volitional act of choice. Nor do I redefine the set in 
Arrow and Debreu on which each person‟s ranking relation is defined. I also retain the 
reflexivity and transitivity of the ranking relations though I give up the completeness restriction. 
And, following Sen‟s (1997) formulation of choice theory, I assign a non-binary personal 
preference relation to each person in the economy. Sen (1994b and 1997) provides several 
contexts in which a person maximizes one‟s own preferences, while simultaneously violating 
binariness of preferences.
31
 The Kanger-Sen non-binary preference ranking relation, in the well-
being sense, can accommodate both zero instrumental value of action norms, as in traditional 
economic theory, and positive instrumental value in promoting or eroding unmodified personal 
wellbeing (pay-offs for players), in the economic theory developed in this paper.  
 
3. Impossibility of Social Identity Diversification 
An example and a simple theorem and proof follow. Suppose    and    are binary 
ranking relations of weak preference defined on a finite set   of alternatives with at least two 
elements. By definition,    and    are identical if, and only if, every pairwise ranking of 
elements of   is exactly the same under both relations. Conversely,    is distinct from   if, and 
only if, there exists a pair of elements (x, y) in   that is ranked in a different order under    than 
under   . Next, 
Step 1: Suppose James is described exclusively by RJ and Kate exclusively by RK both defined 
on the same set S. 
Step 2: By definition, RJ is identical to RK if every pair (x, y) in S is ranked in the same order by 
both RJ and RK and only if it is ranked in the same order by both RJ and RK.  
Step 3: By negation, RJ is distinct from RK if at least one pair (x, y) in S is ranked differently by 
RJ than by RK and only if it is ranked differently by RJ than by RK. 
This implies that: 
(a) James and Kate are indistinguishable if they rank every pair (x, y) in S in the same order, and 
only if they rank it in the same order.  
                                                 
31
 Sen (1997, p. 477-478) mentions (i) reputation and indirect effects, (ii) social commitment and moral imperatives, 
(iii) direct welfare effects, and (iv) conventional rule following, as possible motivations for such behavior. And, in 
the same spirit, he also develops a Fruit Passing game with common knowledge of norms (p. 762). 
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(b) James and Kate are distinct if they rank at least one pair (x, y) in S differently, and only if 
they rank it differently. 
From (a) and (b) the conclusion is: 
(c) A pair-wise ranking difference over at least one pair (x, y) is the exclusive difference that is 
possible between James and Kate. 
Suppose the two binary relations of preferences are distinct. Then, can James be 
interpreted as a dog and Kate as a cat? Or can they be seen as persons of different genders, races, 
religions, tribes, or as persons suffering from different diseases? No, they cannot. For, these 
would constitute inadmissible interpretations that are external to, and superimposed from outside 
of a preference-induced choice-theoretic exercise, and are thus prohibited by entailment of the 
binariness property of individual preferences. This is because the binariness of RJ and RK renders 
James and Kate indistinguishable in every respect, as an entailment, except solely on the basis of 
a pair-wise ranking difference between them of at least one pair of alternatives. Different 
species, races or suffering from different diseases, are all tertiary considerations that go beyond 
the intrinsically admissible difference between two pair-wise rankings of at least one pair of 
alternatives in S by James and Kate. 
Binariness of individual preference ranking relations completely precludes information 
regarding such tertiary considerations as social identity diversification of persons. To set the 
stage for an examination of social identity diversification of individuals, I first prove the 
following impossibility result. 
Theorem 3.1 (Impossibility of Social Diversity): Defined on the set of personal culmination 
outcomes or payoffs as the consequences of the volitional act of choice of actions by a person or 
strategies by a player, if a ranking relation represents individual preferences and it is binary 
then social identity diversification among individual persons or players is impossible. 
Proof: In a finite society of n persons, | |   , consider two distinct persons, J and K. Denote the 
claim that „Person J is identical to (indistinguishable from) Person K‟    . Similarly, denote 
to the claim that „Persons J and K are distinct‟     . Since (    )   (   ), the claim 
that Person J is distinct from Person K is the negation of the claim that Persons J and K are 
indistinguishable. 
Suppose next that Person J is identified exclusively with a binary preference relation   , and 
Person K is identified exclusively with a binary preference relation   , both defined on the same 
set S. Then, formally,  
(      )  (,      - ,          - [(    )   (    )] [ (    )   (    )]). 
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That is, every pair in S is ranked identically by Persons J and K if, and only if, Persons J and K are 
indistinguishable. From the negation of the consequent, it follows that the meaning of “Person   
is distinct from Person  ” is 
(      )  (,      - ,              - [(    )   (    )]).   
Notice that these are “if, and only if” claims, because they are definitions, and the “only if” part 
is not superfluous. Thus in a binary society, for two persons to be distinct it is sufficient that if 
one person has a specific ranking of a pair of alternatives, then a distinct person‟s ranking of at 
least that pair is different. This condition is also necessary. Hence in a binary society, any 
distinction between individuals J and K other than       is excluded.  
Thus, a difference in the order of ranking of at least one pair of alternatives by two 
distinct persons is the one and only difference between them. This disallows all other sources of 
variation among persons. Distinct genders, races, tribal affiliations and all other forms of social 
identity diversification in society, by implication, cannot be a source of variation among persons 
if all persons are identified with binary preferences.  
It is also important to note that the purpose of the work of Arrow and Debreu was to 
identify a set of conditions that are sufficient for the existence of a Walrasian competitive 
general equilibrium. This requires that there exist a finite vector of positive prices (in a unit 
simplex) at which the aggregate excess demand for every commodity is zero. For the aggregation 
of individual demands for any commodity across consumption units and of aggregate supply of 
that commodity across production units, the differentiation of persons by social identity is 
inconsequential – it matters not whether the persons demanding corn are male or female, black or 
white. Thus, in the interest or parsimony, Arrow and Debreu deliberately assume that each 
consumption unit is identified with a ranking relation (defined on the set of mutually exclusive 
alternatives) that satisfies the binariness property. 
Given the purpose of Arrow and Debreu‟s contribution, it would not be a legitimate 
criticism of their work to ask that they should have modeled persons by means of a non-binary 
ranking relation so as to permit social differentiation in their model, because what they are after 
simply does not require such diversification. It also cannot be legitimate, by the same token, to 
employ binariness-salient models – whether of the general equilibrium nature or of the game-
theoretic kind – to examine social-differentiation based injustices including racial and gender 
discrimination. Moreover, in economic theory, every person is concerned solely with 
parametrically given prices in the market, and thus personal decision-making expresses itself as a 
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person‟s direct interaction only with the market, not with other persons.32 Direct social 
interaction is, therefore, completely absent in economic theory.
33
 
   
4. The Concept of Kanger-Sen Non-binary Preference 
 My purpose is to develop an economic theory that Arrow seeks, both with regard to (a) 
possessing rational choice-theoretic foundations at the individual level and (b) in capturing 
“direct social interaction and networks” for including “non-market factors influencing economic 
behavior”. To this end, I consider a finite society and embed the social identity of each person in 
a preference maximization framework. In the formulation I use, preferences are non-binary in the 
Stig Kanger sense:    is a binary ranking relation of weak preference defined on a finite set    of 
alternatives, and    is the background set of the i
th
 person or player upon which    is dependent, 
so that   (   ) defined on    is that person‟s non-binary ranking relation of weak preference. 
Note also that the personal feasible set    of mutually exclusive alternatives is very 
generally construed. However, in particular, it can also be taken to be a finite version of the same 
set as a consumption unit‟s feasible set in Arrow and Debreu (1954), without redefining the 
elements of a personal feasible set of culmination outcomes, in keeping with the typical case of 
the set of payoffs in choice theory, game theory and in general equilibrium theory.
34
 Redefining 
                                                 
32
 Arrow (1998) is clearly headed in this direction when he says (on p. 94), 
The theoretical picture of a market is one of impersonal exchange. … There is no particular relation 
between a supplier and a demander; that is, a supplier is indifferent about supplying one demander or 
another, and vice versa. … Certainly, employment of labor involves direct personal relations between 
employee and employer (or the latter's agents) as well as among employees. Similarly, credit relations … 
have typically required direct personal interaction between debtor and financial institution. … Let us ask 
whether a market-based model can broadly satisfy the[se] empirical constraints…. On the usual 
interpretation, it cannot. If the members of the two races, after adjusting for observable differences in 
human capital and the like, received different wages or were charged different prices in commodity or 
credit markets, an arbitrage possibility would be created which would be wiped out by competition. 
33
 When the auctioneer announces a finite vector of prices, agents make offers of supplies and demands for goods. If 
there is positive (negative) excess demand for a commodity in the aggregate, the auctioneer raises (lowers) the price 
of that commodity. On this see Arrow and Hahn (1971). Once such an iterative process leads to zero excess 
demands for all commodities, a Walrasian equilibrium is achieved, and only then do agents engage in trades at such 
prices. Agents in such an economy never really have any form of direct interaction, social or otherwise. 
34
 While I do not need it for the present exercise, for a richer formulation that would provide a formalization of 
culture, taken to be shared beliefs, I could take the liberty of assuming that    is, in some cases, a set of alternative, 
mutually exclusive comprehensive outcomes (action-process-consequence strings) that in individual preferences 
attach positive constitutive value also to the process by which the choice of action leads to the final consequence, 
rather than ascribing direct, constitutive value only to the culmination outcomes, which is the case with game theory 
in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1942) and in general equilibrium theory in Arrow and Debreu (1954) and Arrow 
and Hahn (1971), among others. 
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the elements of the feasible set also „easily risks turning the “explanation” into a tautology‟ 
according to Arrow (1998, p.95), and is thus an approach to be avoided.
35
 
In a non-binary relation of weak personal preference   ( 
 ) defined on a finite set   , a 
variation in    (say, from   
  to   
 ) can, in general, alter a pair-wise ranking    of a pair of 
alternative actions         , rendering   ( 
 ) a non-binary relation. This is because   , which 
is by assumption a binary relation, is not invariant to tertiary considerations entailed by 
differences in the personal backgrounds of distinct persons, as in a distinction between   
  and 
  
 . For example,   ( 
 ) could refer to the preference of a person who is an African American 
male, and   ( 
 ) can represent a Caucasian male. While the gender of both persons is the same, 
a shared trait that they are both male, they are, in fact and in theory, persons of different races. 
Thus, both shared and distinctive social identities of persons can be accommodated in a model of 
a society with individual Kanger-Sen non-binary preferences. 
In fact, a person‟s community affiliation begets obligation. A person‟s preference for an 
alternative, as more satisfaction or greater desire fulfillment from it, is a feeling, a state of mind, 
which could be a motivation, though not necessarily the sole motivation, in the causal shaping of 
entailed behavior. It has a component of yearning that the concept of behavior completely lacks. 
Undiluted personal preference for an alternative over another could well be intermediated via the 
obligations the person feels from having a social identity insofar as the person‟s community 
affiliation could keep the individual from exhibiting behavior that would have reflected personal 
preference in the absence of this sense of obligation. For example, a woman may actually have a 
strict preference for hot and spicy food over bland food. However, if she is also a lactating 
mother, she could feel obligated by her belonging to the community of breast-feeding women to 
exhibit behavior of eating bland food instead (possibly on the grounds – well-founded or not – 
that hot and spicy food may be bad for a suckling baby‟s health).36 
                                                 
35
 However, this is only one possible interpretation. There are other useful and important interpretations of both the 
elements of the feasible set as well as of the background set of which the ranking relation is a function. They could 
be utilized to explain intra-family interactions, for example. See Sen (1989). 
36
 Distinct social identities do, in fact, exist and these distinctions are embedded in the minds of persons in every 
country in the world. This social reality, in which we are “diversely different”, shapes the way we think. Naturally, 
such distinctions in our minds also get injected into the informal parts of scripts of journal articles or monographs 
that we write in our capacity as economists, including in the contributions of Becker (1957) in the analysis of 
discrimination, and of Akerlof and Kranton (2000) in their examination of identity in economic theory, even though 
in their models all persons have the same identity. 
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To see that a non-binary preference ranking relation does not admit of a utility function 
representation, assume that a person‟s preferences are represented by a non-binary relation 
 (  ) defined on the set S of mutually exclusive alternatives, where R is a binary relation 
defined on S and   is the background set on which R is dependent. Suppose also that this person 
is identified with a utility function      , where S is the set of mutually exclusive 
alternatives and    is the set of real numbers. Then, by definition of a utility function, we have 
       ,  (  )   ( )   ( )-. Consider      . We know that since  (  ) is non-
binary,          (  )     (  )  are both admissible, so that  ( )   ( )  , ( )  
 ( )- are both true. Equivalently,  ( )   ( )   ( )   ( ), which is false. It follows that a 
non-binary preference relation cannot have a utility function representation. 
 
5. Society with Non-Binary Personal Preference Relations 
Next, consider a finite n-array of non-binary preference (desire or yearning) relations, 
 *  (   )     (   )+ 
each identified with a particular person in society. My purpose is to seek a non-empty set of 
social states at which all persons have achieved maximization of their respective personal non-
binary preferences, which are required to be a quasi-ordering (reflexive and transitive, though 
not necessarily complete) of their respective personal feasible sets   .  
5.1 Model 
To develop the requisite theory, I make the following four assumptions 
 
Axiom N (Non-binariness Axiom): Each individual is characterized by a personal non-binary 
ranking relation of weak preference that is defined on a finite set of alternatives. This preference 
relation is   ( 
 ), which is defined on a finite set    of the person‟s feasible set of alternatives, 
and    is that person‟s background set upon which the binary ranking relation    is dependent, 
for all persons   from 1 to a finite n.  
Notice that non-binariness of personal preferences is defined in a very specific sense.
37
 
Axiom Q (Quasi-Ordering Axiom): Every person‟s non-binary relation of weak preference is 
reflexive and transitive but not necessarily complete. 
 
                                                 
37
 The precise content of the concept of non-binariness of preferences taken here, in Axiom N, is exactly the one 
formulated by Stig Kanger on which additional work was done by Sen (1994b), to complete Kanger‟s unfinished 
work, to bring it to the domain of mainstream choice theory. This is precisely the formulation of personal preference 
in Sen‟s (1997) individual choice theory.  
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Axiom M (Maximization Axiom): Every person engages in a volitional act of choice by 
maximizing one‟s own personal preferences defined on the personal feasible set of actions. 
 
Axiom I (Social Interaction Axiom): Social interaction takes the form of interpersonal interaction 
among individual social creatures. 
 
These four axioms collectively entail the following three conditions: 
 
Condition S (Social Identity Diversification): There exists of a social state with endogenous 
social differentiation of persons, with each person being a social creature with multiple social 
identities deriving from affiliation with distinct, though overlapping communities (or subsets) of 
persons in society. 
 
Condition J (Violations of Justice): The social state identified in Condition S is consistent with 
flagrant violations of justice that take the form of conflicts between socially distinct groups. 
 
Condition P (Pareto optimality): The social state identified in Condition S is Pareto optimal.  
 
The groundwork for an examination of a non-binary society with social diversification is now 
laid. Some additional formalization is necessary for the demonstration of the principal 
conclusions of this paper in the next section. 
 
 5.2. Formalization 
For a given set   
 
, let   (  
 ) be person i‟s binary relation of weak preference that stands 
for “at least as good as”, which is defined on a finite set    of alternatives social states, and   
 
 is 
a background set on which the binary relation    is dependent, with        , and           
specifying the possible parametric variations,   
 
, of person i‟s background set. Here,     is 
finite,      is finite, and    also finite with at least three elements. 
For   (  
 ) , we can define the asymmetric part   (  
 ) that stands for “strict preference”, 
and the symmetric part   (  
 ) that stands for “indifference” as follows. 
Definition 9: (             ) ,[   (  
 ) ]  [   (  
 ) ]-  [   (  
 ) ] . 
Definition 10: (             ) ,[   (  
 ) ]  [   (  
 ) ]-  [   (  
 ) ] . 
In this context, it is important to note that a variation in a tertiary consideration, viz., a 
parametric variation in the background set, can, in general, alter the order of personal preference 
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insofar as (                ) [   (  
 ) ]  ,   (  
 ) -, are both admissible, thereby 
rendering   (  
 ) a non-binary relation. 
My purpose here is to examine if a social interaction outcome based on non-binary 
personal preferences exists, and whether it is Pareto optimal. I prove that, in fact, there exists 
such an outcome, and that it is Pareto optimal, under some extremely mild conditions (Axioms N, 
Q, M and I), at least judging by the restrictions imposed in the literature to demonstrate the 
existence of alternative types of equilibria that are based on mainstream utility theory and choice 
theory. 
Clearly, such a social outcome is a generalization that goes considerably beyond all of the 
alternative concepts of equilibrium in general equilibrium theory in economics that are 
predicated on binary personal preferences. It would also constitutes a generalization of some 
equilibrium concepts in game theory, and is sufficiently comprehensive in scope that it does not 
succumb to some crucial criticisms of the behavioral foundations of game theory discussed by 
Sen (1985), where the matter of restrictiveness of “privateness” of each person in economic 
theory versus “socialness” of personal identity in social reality is brought out most forcefully. I 
shall have more to say on this in Section 8. 
The implications of the existence of a non-binary preference based Pareto optimal social 
interaction outcome are quite far-reaching in terms of providing formal explanations of many 
sociological, economic and political phenomena that binary-preference based conceptual 
structures fail to do. 
6. Existence of a Pareto Optimal State under Non-Binariness 
Importantly enough, once binariness is dropped as a feature of personal preferences in a 
society, the utility function as a numerical representation of personal preferences is also 
jettisoned from economic theory. Additionally, the non-binary personal preference theory is 
general enough to accommodate violations of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference, as would 
naturally occur if, in personal choice, preference were to change upon variation from one 
background set to another distinct one. 
23 
 
To achieve these objectives, I utilize three lemmas in Sen (1970), and with relatively 
minor generalizations, prove an existence theorem below.
38
 First, however, some additional 
definitions are in order. 
Definition 11:   (  
 ) is reflexive over    if and only if (           ) [   (  
 ) ] . 
Definition 12:   (  
 ) is transitive over    if and only if the following holds: 
(                ) ,[   (  
 ) ]  [   (  
 ) ]-  [   (  
 ) ] . 
 
Definition 13: A ranking relation that is reflexive and transitive is called a quasi-ordering.
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Let   ⋃ (⋃   
   
   
 
   ), and   ⋂   
 
      , and assume that S has at least three elements. 
Definition 14: A social interaction outcome rule is a functional relation f that assigns exactly one 
social ranking  (   ) of S to an inter-personal non-binary preference profile, such that 
 (   )   .  (  
 )     (  
 )/   where        (  
 ) is a quasi-ordering of   .
40
  
By  (   )we denote the asymmetric part of  (   ).We next turn to unanimity over a pair of 
alternatives under all possible variations of the background set to define Pareto preference. 
Definition 15A:           [       (  
 )  ]     ̂(   )   . 
Definition 15B:           [       (  
 )  ]     ̂(   )  . 
Remark: Definition 15A is a generalization of the Pareto „preference or indifference‟ rule denoted 
by  ̂(   )to non-binary personal preferences over the set S of alternative social states, and 
similarly, Definition 15B is a generalization of the Pareto „strict preference‟ rule, denoted by 
 ̂(   ).41 
Definition 16: A social state x in S is Pareto optimal if and only if it is not Pareto dominated by 
any state y in S in accordance with Definition 7B. 
                                                 
38
 Lemma 6.2 below is Sen‟s (1997) own generalization to non-binary preferences. Lemma 6.1 below is my 
generalization to non-binary preferences, and Theorem 6.1 is our generalization of a lemma in Sen (1970), also to 
the case of non-binary preferences. 
39
 Reflexivity of   (  
 ) is not a very demanding restriction. To see this, consider two persons, indexed 1 and 2, 
where 1 is male and 2 is female. Then    (  
 )  and    (  
 )  essentially means that both men and women regard 
an element of their feasible set at least as good as itself. Similarly for the transitivity property.  
40
 A social interaction outcome rule is a generalization of what Sen (1970) calls a collective choice rule. 
41
 The ethical principle in Definition 15B is also known as the weak Pareto rule.  
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Finally, using Definitions 14, 15A and 15B, and by requiring that ,   (   )  -  ,   ̂(   ) - 
and ,   (   )  -  ,   ̂(   ) -, we can obtain a maximal social interaction outcome by using 
the following two lemmas. 
 LEMMA 6.1.  ̂(   ) is a quasi-ordering of S. 
Proof: Following Sen (1970, Lemma 2*a, p.29)), 
         , since by Definition 14,        (  
 )   , it follows that  ̂(   ) is reflexive. Also, 
         [   ̂(   )        ̂(   ) ]  [    {       (  
 )        (  
 )  }] 
          ,       (  
 )  - 
    ̂(   ) .     
Next, consider 
DEFINITION 17:  ( ̂    )  * |     ,        ̂(   )  -+ . 
Remark: The social interaction maximal set of socially undominated elements of S is fully 
captured by Definition 17 with respect to the weak Pareto rule  ̂(   ), which is the asymmetric 
part given in Definition 15B.  
LEMMA 6.2.  The maximal set is non-empty for every finite set quasi-ordered by a non-binary 
preference relation. 
Proof: Again, following Sen (1970, Lemma 1*b, p.11, and Sen (1997)), let   *       +. 
Assign a real number        and follow the recursive rule       ̂(   )             , and 
        otherwise, so that by construction,    is a maximal element.   
Remark: Note that since (                ) [   (  
 ) ]  ,   (  
 ) - are both 
admissible, personal preferences are non-binary, but this poses no problem for obtaining a 
nonempty social maximal set since the personal non-comparability of a pair of alternatives in    
is rendered irrelevant for defining the maximal set. This, of course, is not true of the social 
optimal set of best elements that is defined as  ( ̂    )  * |              ̂(   ) +, 
which is rendered empty by (                ) [   (  
 ) ]  ,   (  
 ) -being  both 
admissible. 
Thus, requiring maximizing behavior as an act of volitional personal choice, instead of 
the more demanding optimization, does have an advantage in the case of non-comparability 
arising from non-binariness of personal preferences. In fact, it should not come as a surprise that 
once there is a social quasi-ordering which ranks at least one pair of alternatives, though not 
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necessarily all such pairs, if and only if these two alternatives are comparable over all individuals 
and over all background sets, there must exist an element which is Pareto undominated and thus 
Pareto optimal. This would also follow from Zorn's lemma. 
In the case of personal choice theory, Sen (1997) exploits precisely this combination of 
non-binariness of preferences (and the entailed incomplete ranking), and maximizing behavior 
that precipitates the existence of a maximal element despite incompleteness. He thus obtains 
more general results than can be deduced from binary personal preferences constitute a complete 
ordering and optimizing behavior that necessitates completeness for the existence of an optimal 
element – this is the formulation of standard rational choice theory. Sen‟s (1997) formalization is 
of a decision maker who has non-binary preferences. To obtain a nonempty social interactional 
set, rather than a nonempty personal maximal set, a group of finite n persons needs to be 
considered. For this case, based on Lemma 6.1 and Lemma 6.2, the following result is 
immediate. 
Theorem 6.1 (Existence of Unjust Pareto Optimal State): Axioms N, Q, M and I are sufficient 
for the existence of a social state that is characterized by Conditions S, J and P. 
Proof:
42
 It is to be proved that for every set of non-binary personal preferences 
.  (  
 )     (  
 )/ over a finite set S of alternative social states, where        (  
 ) is a 
quasi-ordering, there exists a nonempty maximal social interaction set  ( ̂    ) that contains 
at least one Pareto optimal state. 
 
By Lemma 6.1, the Pareto preference-or-indifference relation  ̂(   ) is a quasi-ordering of the 
set S of alternative social states. And the Pareto-optimal subset of S is identical to the social 
maximal set  ( ̂    ). Further, since S is finite, and  ̂(   ) quasi-orders it, by Lemma 6.2, 
 ( ̂    ) is nonempty. Hence a non-binary personal preferences based social interaction 
outcome exists, and it is Pareto optimal.  
Notice that, unlike the case of the existence of equilibrium in an Arrow-Debreu exchange 
economy, and unlike the case of existence of Nash equilibrium, for our existence result I do not 
impose the requirement of completeness; in fact, I cannot impose it because incompleteness is 
entailed by non-binariness, if it has any cutting power. Nor indeed do I require preferences to be 
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 The proof of Lemma 6.1, and therefore of Theorem 6.1, goes through if transitivity is weakened to Definition 12A: 
Acyclicity: which holds if and only if (                     ) ,(    (  
 )   & 
    (  
 )            (  
 )  )-      (  
 )  , provided “quasi-ordering” is replaced by “reflexive and acyclic 
ranking” after Definition 12 is replaced by Definition 12A. These two may be called Lemma 6.1A and Theorem 6.1A, 
respectively. For further details, see Berdellima and Naqvi (2011). 
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binary, as in Kelsey (1995). Moreover, moving from form to alternative interpretations of the 
background set, and by considering parametric variations of this set, many of the inadequacies in 
explanations of social and economic phenomena entailed by binariness are entirely jettisoned, 
replaced instead by a much more comprehensive conceptual structure that still exhibits the 
unanimity property over a pair of alternatives. Also, the scope and reach of this non-binary 
model is so substantial that it also capable of formalizing the criticism of the game theory 
literature contained in Sen (1985). 
7. Illustrations 
In the conceptual structure of Sections 5 and 6, individuals can have distinct identities, 
they can identify with different groups of persons, they can share identities, escape, or not, from 
“the illusion of destiny,”43 to diminish or exacerbate violence, exhibit, or not, the behavior of 
injustice in the form of discrimination, and so on. However, there are four issues in particular 
that arose in the development of the argument in previous sections, but were not addressed 
adequately, because the further development of the ideas would detract from the continuity of the 
argument. I shall deal with them in this section, before I sum up. 
7.1 Racial Discrimination 
The reason discrimination in one form or another has piqued the interest of some of the 
sharpest minds in our profession is that it is deemed profoundly unjust. We would rather have 
society exhibit greater harmony, less violence, have more say in their own individual lives – 
including political voice, people obeying tax laws, not violating criminal laws, and in general 
being civil to one another. It is this civil characteristic of a good society, when violated, often 
causes us to experience a feeling of revulsion at the unfairness or injustice of some actions, 
especially if we notice that these are ongoing actions that repeatedly harm the same segment of a 
society. Sometimes we may not notice such actions because they have become so commonplace 
in our social reality, unless, of course, we happen to be at the receiving end of the injustice. 
Discrimination is one such injustice. It is important to ask if it is remediable, and to the extent 
that it is, its mitigation can be taken to be one of the goals of public policy. Such an exercise 
would constitute an attempt to formalize the search for paths to peace and amity among people 
who are being uncivil to each other, as recently articulated by Sen (2006). Sen (2006) argues that 
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 Sen (2006). 
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if different person‟s multiple shared identities are recognized and highlighted in reasoned public 
discourse, it would serve to diminish the influence of the fomenters of hatred which, as we shall 
see, have actual fatal consequences, sometimes in the form of carnage. 
Fortuitously, Sen (2009) provides guidance in approaching this difficult subject of 
economics and justice. Sen (2009) argues that it can be a very constructive endeavor to define 
The Idea of Justice as the removal of remediable injustices. This is to be contrasted with all 
previous theories of justice that are contractarian in the sense of arriving at a single set of 
principles of justice, and seeking the characterization or attainment of a perfectly just 
arrangement in society, regardless of how this concept of perfectness is construed. In this regard, 
„What moves us, reasonably enough,‟ writes Sen‟s (2009), 
 
is not that the world falls short of being completely just – which few of us expect – but that there are clearly 
remediable injustices around us which we want to eliminate. …. It is fair to assume that Parisians would 
not have stormed the Bastille, Gandhi would not have challenged the empire on which the sun used not to 
set, Martin Luther King would not have fought white supremacy in „the land of the free and the home of the 
brave‟, without their sense of manifest injustices that could be overcome. They were not trying to achieve a 
perfectly just world (even if there were agreement on what that would look like), but they did want to 
remove clear injustices to the extent they could. (p. vii). 
 
 Sen‟s (2009) approach to justice is much more practical in nature, and can be easily and 
most fruitfully combined with a non-binary economic theory proposed here, to investigate many 
common pernicious social injustices and their remedies.  A program worthy of pursuit would be 
an Injustice Mitigation Program: In a non-binary society, a public-policy induced manipulation 
of personal background sets, in favor of emphasizing in the public consciousness a wider domain 
of shared identities, especially aimed at groups in conflict, can serve to mitigate remediable 
injustices, including overcoming intolerance and discrimination, and thus violence by one group 
against another, especially if done via open and free reasoned public discourse, particularly in a 
democracy. 
Such a program of investigation would take our understanding beyond the range of issues 
Sen (2009) covers in addition to Sen (2006). This, however, is the subject matter of another piece 
of work. What is important to remember is that a contextual reference is crucial to the 
















Black 70.68 77.57 0.9169 19,996 21,808 
White 76.19 81.21 0.9851 123,528 125,391 
L.E. (WM-BM) =5.51 W(M/F)-B(M/F)=0.0682 1,488=BM Deficit 
 
Life Expectancy at birth (years) in U.S.A., 200744 
and 
U.S. Resident Population (1000s) by Sex, Race, and Hispanic-Origin Status, 2009 
 
 
According to the Census Bureau, in 2009 there were 917 African American males per 
thousand African American females in the United States. Per one thousand white females, there 
were 985 while males, however. Per 1000 African American females there are 68 fewer African 
American males than white males per 1000 white females. Since there were in 2009, in terms of 
thousands, 21,808 African American females, multiplying this by 68 gives almost 1.5 million 
missing African American males. That they are fewer than they should be, can also be confirmed 
by the life expectancy figures for 2007. African American are expected to live, on average, to the 
age of 71, white males to 76, black females to 78, and white females to 81. Why? 
We know that pretty much all around the world, women outnumber men – except in 
India, China, Pakistan, and some other countries of north Africa, where females receive 
considerably adverse social, economic and political treatment than do males, as a consequence of 




 But, why do blacks live shorter lives than whites – whether male or female – in the 
United States?
46
 Since pure races are almost extinct: certainly in the U.S. in 2007, almost all 
whites are a little black by heredity. Similarly, almost all blacks are a little white genetically. So, 
what is the cause of different life expectancies of “white males” and “black males,” on the one 
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http://cdc.gov/NCHS/products/nvsr.htm#vol58/ . For population by race and gender, see 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0006.pdf. 
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hand, and between whites‟ and blacks‟ life expectancies in general, on the other? Due to genetic 
mixing, the answer must be positioned not in the biological domain but in the field of social 
treatment received by blacks versus whites. This is an inescapable conclusion for this society at 
this time. 
 There is no need to belabor the point that social treatment of distinct socio-economic 
groups in society is invariably unequal. What is it that characterizes these groups of interest? 
And, what is the exact nature of the inequality of the social treatment they are receiving, and 
more importantly, accepting. Collective consciousness, imbued with beliefs (a) about reality, 
with values of (b) what is sacred and what profane, combined with (c) individual free will to 
make a reasoned (i) choice from amongst alternative sets of these very beliefs and values, and 
(ii) choice of a specific action out of a feasible set of alternatives, is what gets expressed as a 
social interaction outcome in a society, typically referred to as an equilibrium or a stationary 
state in economic theory. Barring some outliers, most persons tend to conform to the dominant 
form of beliefs and values of the time. More importantly, if multiple social interaction outcomes 
(corresponding to multiple equilibria) can occur under mildly distinct sets of collective beliefs, 
then it may be possible to identify the specific characteristics that differ, so that a policy-induced 
change in one set that supports a more unjust social outcome may be able to jolt the economy 
into switching to another social interaction outcome to achieve a little more justice in society. 
 Of course there are substantial issues of incentive compatibility here that have not been 
addressed, which are important in their own right. Also, requiring unanimity of ranking over a 
given pair of alternatives, embodied in the Pareto criterion, is a very exacting demand for beliefs 
and values to constitute part of culture. These however, are not the directions in which this paper 
purports to make a contribution.
47
 
An economic theory of justice, which would permit the identification of injustice-curative 
policies, and which is of fundamental importance to individuals, society, national governments 
and world governance organizations, can, in fact, be developed in the framework of the model I 
have proposed in this paper. It can be argued that to understand the mechanisms by which at least 
the remediable injustices can be removed is a valuable goal of public policy and the case for 
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constructing an economic theory of such social injustices and their removal is unquestionably 
strong.  
7.2 Arrow-Debreu Model with Social-cum-Economic Stratification  
It would be helpful to have a formal theory of social interaction, which takes the form of 
interpersonal interaction among social beings with multiple community affiliations, in addition 
to each person‟s interaction with the Walrasian auctioneer, as in Arrow and Hahn (1971). Arrow 
and Debreu (1954) write, “we assume the existence of a number of consumption units, typically 
families or individuals but including also institutional consumers.” Further, “The set of 
consumption vectors Xi available to individual i (=1, … , m) is a closed convex subset of    
which is bounded from below; i.e., there is a vector        for all        .” (p. 278). Let every 
“consumption unit”, which I shall call a person, be engaged in a volitional act of choice from 
amongst mutually exclusive actions, by maximization of one‟s own Kanger-Sen non-binary 
preference relation, which quasi-order each person‟s feasible set, without redefining the elements 
of the feasible set in Arrow and Debreu, except to take it as finite set. In this model, social 
differentiation of persons emerges in society, as I have demonstrated above. Each individual, in 
this social economic theory model is a social creature with multiple identities.  
Further, in this model, let us retain the Arrow-Debreu (a) the production structure, (b) 
their exogenously given interpersonal distribution of commodity endowments, and (c) the 
exogenous distribution of property rights to shares in “production units” (or firms) in the 
economy. 
The resultant model has the distinction that it is also possible to exogenously assign 
distinct commodity endowments and different property rights to fractional ownership of 
production units (corporate shares) to individuals who belong to socially distinct communities. 
Such an economy would tend to exhibit distinct endowment distributions and different corporate-
share ownership that could vary systematically by race, gender, ethnicity, age group, and so on, 
including some unfortunate groups who would have no such rights to fractional ownership in 
firms. This is a model of an economy that has socially distinct communities that also differ by 
wealth holdings, and thus can exercise differential political power in influencing the social 
outcome.  
Basu (2010) argues that if an entrepreneur‟s ability to make an investor and a customer 
better-off by setting up a business is dependent the customer‟s and the investor‟s conjectures 
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about the entrepreneur‟s ability to do so, then the content of the conjectures will determine 
whether entrepreneurial activity will or will not occur in equilibrium. Strategic reciprocity 
inherent in the supermodularity property of choice of actions by persons, by itself determines the 
entrepreneur‟s ability to create greater value for both the customer and the investor. Moreover, 
this can induce a real bifurcation among ex ante identical agents who are potential entrepreneurs, 
so that while ex ante identically productive, the subset who are believed by others (the customers 
and investors) to be more productive do, in fact, exhibit higher productivity ex post, and they 
start to wear a badge of higher productivity, while others who are ex ante identical do not. This 
productivity-based differentiation is precipitated precisely because the customer and the investor 
both believe in the higher productivity of a subgroup of entrepreneurs, so more clients are willing 
to sign contracts with the badge-wearing persons.
48
 All this happens even without anybody 
having any personal prejudice, individual discrimination, at all, and the beliefs underlying the 
conjectures of the customer and the investor end up shaping the social reality of who gets to be 
an entrepreneur and who does not. 
The productivity-based differentiation of persons in society is important because that is 
the sole concern of firms that demand labor, because they are simple profit maximizers, as in 
Arrow and Debreu. Behavior of a large enough number of persons based on beliefs that have no 
innate basis in social reality can actually produce a social reality that vindicates those beliefs. 
This is the upshot of conjectural general equilibrium theory, in which the Arrow-Debreu 
equilibrium arises if all agents have competitive conjectures (that market prices are 
parametrically external to their decisions). 
More profound is Basu‟s recognition of multiple equilibria in these reciprocity-salient 
supermodular games, with an equilibrium here exhibiting stagnation but one there bursting with 
entrepreneurial excitement, energy and rapid development, and public action in such cases would 
be called for to bump the economy from the “bad” to the “good” equilibrium of the game. 
Unfortunately, the argument does not carry over to racial-discrimination equilibrium versus 
racial-harmony equilibrium as multiple equilibria of such a supermodular game, nor to gender, 
ethnicity or any other social-identity based distinctions or injustices. But, with a small extension, 
the argument would be applicable to social injustices also, and that is what I attempt to provide 
in this paper. 
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What Basu shows is the differentiation of a group of otherwise identical persons ex ante, 
due to the conjectures of other agents, into more productive and less productive subgroups ex 
post. However, the mapping of the set H of persons who are differentiated by productivity to the 
set Ψ of the social identity markers of the persons still remains to be established. And to 
construct this mapping, so that differentially productive persons can take on distinct, though 
overlapping social identities such as gender, race, ethnicity, and so on, requires a model that 
endogenously exhibits social identity diversification as an intrinsic feature of an attainable social 
state of an economy. 
If this social identity diversification of person that I have proposed in this paper is 
combined with Basu‟s (2010, 89-95) model of endogenous productivity differentiation of 
otherwise productivity-wise identical individuals, it becomes a very rich and powerful model that 
is capable of providing formal explanations of a great many phenomena, especially in public 
choice theory, or new political economy, where social identity differentiation and differences in 
wealth holdings associated with socially distinct persons are material to the object of 
investigation, and such wealth-cum-ethnicity outcomes would arise endogenously. Such formally 
sound investigations have yet to be undertaken.
49
  
The various marks of identification of individuals emerge from identifying with or 
associating with distinct, though overlapping communities – by the perception of others in 
society. And the collectivity of these others with whom we associate, due to one cause or 
another, with some of our social identities taking priority over others on different occasions, 
cannot but influence our own personal beliefs of what we believe to be reality, including, and 
especially social reality. Nor indeed can the expressed values by others in the varied 
communities to which we belong have no effect whosoever on our values of right and wrong, or 
of good and bad, or what is or is not one‟s duty or obligation to do in a given circumstance, 
solely because the person belongs to a community with some obligations. Association begets 
obligation. Obligation influences motivation. Motivation underlying behavior is, therefore, made 
up of preferences, community affiliation with obligations pertaining to one‟s social identity that 
deliberately restrict individual instrumentalities, and free will in both the form of maximizing 
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correspondences derived from utility functions. 
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behavior and in the form of selecting personal values from alternative sets. Interpersonal 
interaction of such social creatures is social interaction. 
A model of a society of persons who engage in the act of maximizing their own personal 
non-binary preferences that quasi-order the mutually exclusive alternatives in their feasible (in 
some important cases, budget) sets brings to life injustices suffered by one group of persons in a 
finite society in what appears to be at the hands of another socially distinct group, although it is 
actually collective prejudice, distinguished from individualistic prejudice, that is contained in 
collective beliefs. Such a model can also help identify redress of each of these collective, rather 
than individualistic, injustices that spring from social identity diversification of persons in 
society. 
7.3. A Methodological Issue 
An equilibrium exists in this model in the sense of a non-empty social maximal set 
defined on a finite set of alternatives that are quasi-ordered by the social non-binary ranking 
relation  ( ).  This model endogenously exhibits social identity differentiation, and there can be 
multiple equilibria supported by distinct rational conjectures in the manner of Basu, thereby 
implying the existence of equilibria in which, ex post, African American males exhibit a lower 
productivity, a lower life expectancy and lower peak median income than white males, not to 
mention a disgracefully higher incarceration rate that African Americans males suffer. 
At a very fundamental level, Arrow (1998) addresses an issue of some intricacy that gets 
to the heart of the issue I am addressing in this paper, at the level of economic theory: 
 
Most analysts, following Becker (1957), add to the usual list of commodities some special disutility which 
whites attach to contact with blacks, taste-based discrimination. … The trouble with these explanations is 
that they contradict in a direct way the usual view of employers as simple profit-maximizers. While they do 
not contradict rational choice theory, they undermine it by introducing an additional variable. 
There are at least two objections to this line of analysis. One is that introducing new variables 
easily risks turning the "explanation" into a tautology. …and it certainly would be a parody of economics   
to multiply entities in this anti-Occamian fashion. Perhaps more serious is the neglect of Darwinian 
principles. (pp. 94-95) 
 
So, Arrow considers (i) contradict[ing] in a direct way the usual view of employers as simple 
profit-maximizers, (b) violating the principle of survival of the fitter, and (c) „introducing new 
variables [, which] easily risks turning the "explanation" into a tautology‟, objectionable. 
34 
 
In fact, taken together with the Basu (2010) twist, the non-binary personal preferences 
based model I have proposed does not violate any of the minimal requirements Arrow (1998) has 
suggested for an adequate theory of racial discrimination. 
 In my explanation of social identity diversification of individuals, I have the same 
feasible sets of individuals as the “consumption units” have in Arrow and Debreu. Each person is 
still a maximizer of one‟s own individual quasi-ordering of feasible alternatives. Choice theory 
has, therefore, not been compromised, especially since everybody is a personal non-binary 
preference maximizer of a quasi-ordered set of alternatives. Further, “the producer” is also a 
“simple profit maximizer”, who hires or does not hire black or white employees in specific 
occupations. However, the producer-entrepreneur also imbibes values from the collective beliefs 
that embody prejudice against blacks. Unfortunately however, upon examination of the imbibed 
beliefs, the simple-profit maximizing producer would find that, due to the force of such 
pernicious beliefs in society, his prejudicial beliefs are vindicated, because by reducing the 
incentives for African Americans to engage in education, training and self-improvement, they 
have ex post rendered vast numbers, though, of course, not all, of the African American 
community to actually exhibit lower productivity, thereby reinforcing the stereotype. After all, 
racial discrimination does manifest itself in terms of just shy of one-and-a-half million missing 
African American males in early 21
st
 Century. It also expresses itself in terms of a 5 ½-year 
shorter life expectancy for African American males compared to white males during the same 
period. Why would it not express itself also in terms of endogenous productivity differentials in 
the manner Basu (2010) has suggested in a different context?  
Since the model I am proposing here is actually diversified by persons with distinct 
social-identity dependent capabilities and social-identity dependent wellbeing-achievements, and 
employers are, as in Arrow and Debreu (1954), simple profit maximizers, the force of Darwinian 
principles is somewhat muted. The methodological issue of introducing new variables does need 
to be addressed, however. I deal with this next. 
Were it not for utter existential intolerance of any forms of social heterogeneity under the 
preference structure ascribed to consumption units in Arrow and Debreu (1954), there would be 
no need to introduce any new variable. But the binariness property of preferences in their model 
is so inimical to social identity diversification that, in principle, for racial discrimination, or of 
any other kind, to exhibit itself, it is necessary to introduce a new variable. I use   (  ), as a 
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non-binary relation of personal preference dependent on that person‟s background set, instead of 
only    in Arrow-Debreu, without the background set    that I include. 
The operational issue turns not on whether a new variable should be introduced (it 
certainly does have to be for social differentiation), but on what exactly should be the properties 
of the newly introduced set,    called a person‟s background set in   (  ). In Arrow and Debreu 
(1954) and in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1942),      ̅. In the context of racial 
discrimination in the United States, as expressed in terms of males,    *            + and 
   *              +. This characterization of background sets would not apply at all if the 
interest were in examining gender discrimination, whether in the U.S., or elsewhere.
50
 Individual 
conjectures would also have to be correspondingly different, in terms of substantive content, 
pertaining to genders, rather than relating to racial differences. Notice, however, that the 
consequences for life expectancy differences may not be the same, though biased in the same 
direction, in the distinct forms of racial and gender discrimination, caused by adverse social 
treatment of the aggrieved. Of course, neither specification of background sets would be 
applicable if the object were to understand caste discrimination in India. 
The crucial point is that the „new variable‟, which is a person‟s background set, is 
dependent on the context of the issue under investigation. We ought not to look for some 
mathematical properties such as compactness or convexity, but rather treat background sets as 
context-dependent. The ingenuity of the economist would then reside in the proximity-in-
predictive (or explanatory) power of the specification of the background set in explaining a 
specific social interaction outcome.  
I am actually advocating a move in the direction back from generality to particularity of 
modeling the specific phenomenon under investigation. In ascertaining aggregate demand for a 
commodity at any given price, it is irrelevant whether the demander is black or white. Not so, 
however, if the object of investigation is racial discrimination. The characterization of a person‟s 
background set is necessarily context dependent. 
This context-dependent background set in an analysis of racial discrimination in the 
United States is by no means the same as in the matter of gender discrimination in the world. The 
form it takes, the groups involved, the proportions of the population with distinct social 
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identities, all vary greatly. Caste based conflict in India is another context completely distinct 
from both gender and racial discrimination, although all three, far too often, lead to the same 
disagreeable outcome, of making the lives of far too many persons considerably more morbid 
and shorter. In the pursuit of more and more general results in economic theory, we appear to 
have gone too far in the direction of homogenizing persons by our assumptions to make our 
models incapable of addressing specific social injustices. Some back-tracking in the direction of 
context-dependent particularity seems to be necessary for addressing issues of specific social 
injustices and their remedies. 
8. Concluding Remarks 
Existing collective beliefs that effectively mediate personal wellbeing maximization as a 
volitional act of choice by each of a finite number of players, by deliberately limiting individual 
instrumentalities, taken together with representation of the maximand by a Kanger-Sen non-
binary ranking relation that quasi-orders a belief-independent feasible set of alternatives of 
choice, is the formal framework I present in this paper, whether taken as an exchange model or 
with production as in Arrow and Debreu (1954). This model is considerably richer in terms of 
the information that it deems admissible in the characterization of an individual member of a 
group. The replacement of a binary by a non-binary ranking relation precipitates the possibility 
of social identity diversification of individuals in the group with overlapping community 
affiliations, which is disallowed by binariness. 
Since each community affiliation obligates an individual to not violate specific types of 
action norms that the community deems unacceptable, individual instrumental possibilities 
become further restricted. By explicitly admitting the possibility that the instrumental value (over 
and above the constitutive value) of action norms is not zero – unlike the implicit assumption in 
contemporary economic theory that it is zero – collective beliefs begin to have some cutting 
power in translating personal preference maximization into exhibited behavior. In some 
instances, the role of collective beliefs may be to engender cooperation and thereby enhance 
every player‟s own unmodified wellbeing, as in an escape from the prisoners‟ dilemma.51 In 
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other instances, collective beliefs can support conflicts that are abhorrently unjust social 
outcomes, such as discrimination, shorter life spans of some members of a group for reasons that 
are extra-biological and higher incarceration rates, to name a few. 
Sen (2006) identifies the illusion of destiny of a person‟s unique identity that can breed 
hatred and violence, when fomenters of communal discord emphasize excessively such a 
solitary, divisive social identity of persons, inter alia devaluing a great many other social 
identities that the same persons actually share. Sen (2006) also argues that bloodshed need not, in 
fact, be the outcome if the spuriousness of this illusion of destined divisive identity is exposed 
through public discourse. He champions transparency and uninhibited public discourse in also 
serving to remove injustices of discrimination and killings inevitably inflicted by propagators of 
intolerance on vulnerable segments of society. I have tried in this paper to provide the outlines of 
a formal economic-theoretic framework in which these weighty matters can be discussed 
coherently.   
  
                                                                                                                                                             
43). Second, preference are characterized by my „privateness‟ or autonomy, as being completely independent of 
others in terms of my immunity to influences that are external to me. Thus my preference does not intrinsically 
incorporate any positive-feeling (such as sympathy) or negative-feeling (such as envy) or neutral-feeling (such as 
commitment) towards any other person. Thus, the concept of a person (or player) whose preference is being 
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